AVIARY TRANSCRIPTION

Watergate 45 years later, what have we learned

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Plain Text Exported From Aviary: 2024-09-03T16:59:15


TRANSCRIPTION BEGIN

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Good evening, I'm Krista Johnson, political

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science major and co-chair of the Committee on

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Lecture's, funded by the government of the student

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body. And I would like to welcome you all to the

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panel tonight. We are honored to host this event

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as a part of our lecture series that includes more

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than one hundred and thirty speakers every year,

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including the World Food Prize laureates who spoke

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earlier this week. Additionally, on Monday, we

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will be hosting crisis manager Judy Smith, whose

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career is the basis for the ABC show Scandal. And

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on the following Monday, the long awaited writer

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Bill Bryson. Before I introduce our moderator, I

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would like to thank our co-sponsors. The First

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Amendment days, the Greenlee School of Journalism

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and Communication, History, Philosophy and

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Religious Studies, Political Science and the

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University Library. And now our moderator, who is

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professor and chair of the Department of Political

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Science here at Iowa State. He was a congressional

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fellow and Congressman Lee Hamilton s office. He

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has authored and edited 12 books, including

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American Foreign Policy and Process and the

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domestic sources of American Foreign Policy. He

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has also published more than 70 book chapters and

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journal articles, and he is the recipient of

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numerous awards. However, we political science

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majors believe that his greatest accomplishments

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are in the classroom. Please join me in welcoming

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our moderator for the evening, Dr. James McCormick,

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who.

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Thank you very much, Krista, for that kind

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introduction. I'd like to also add my welcome to

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everyone here tonight what a wonderful audience

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for this very kind of historic event here. For me,

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this panel and topic are not only a sort of a

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history lesson about the congressional role in the

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impeachment process, but as you can tell from my

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hair here, this is also a trip down memory lane

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for me since I watched intently the Watergate

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hearings in the summer of 1973 and then the

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impeachment process a year later. We're going to

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start this evening by having a short video

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documentary entitled Reflections on Watergate.

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It's about 10 minutes long. And then we'll proceed

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to introduce the panel and have our discussion. So

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we'll go ahead with the video.

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Good evening. It was almost two years ago, in June

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1972, that five men broke into the Democratic

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National Committee headquarters in Washington. It

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turned out that they were connected with my

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reelection committee and the Watergate break in

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became a major issue in the campaign. The basic

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question at issue today is whether the president

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personally acted improperly in the Watergate

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matter.

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Well, when you grow up in Iowa, which I did. And

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it was the son of immigrants we prided ourselves

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in our country, you know, we were proud of our

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country, proud of our president. We may not have

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agreed with everything the president said. So

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that's what I grew up with. I grew up with our

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names. We listened to the president's on the radio,

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though not as much television. And it gave us a

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sense of pride then that period where I go to

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Congress. And just because I was a different party

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from Nixon and I had met Nixon at the White House

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when we got sworn in, it wasn't enough just

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because we differed with him on policy or certain

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issues to vote for the impeachment. So that's

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really what I walked into when I was elected in

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November. In the general election, I had to decide

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what committees I wanted to be on, and I decided I

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did not want to be on the House Judiciary

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Committee, of course, not knowing that it would be

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in the middle of history when it would have to

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take up the impeachment of Richard Nixon. Of

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course, if anybody had the slightest inkling that

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there would be an impeachment inquiry, you know, I

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would never have been put on the House Judiciary

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Committee. I was a brand new member. I had no

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clout. And there's no way that the leadership

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would have ever given me such a plum assignment.

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There have been allegations, insinuations that I

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knew about the planning of the Watergate break in

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and that I was involved in an extensive plot to

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cover it up. The House Judiciary Committee is now

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investigating these charges. From our perspective

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and from the committee's role, it was a

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combination of putting the presidency on trial. We

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had to decide whether or not under our

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Constitution, this one check of the abuse of power,

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whether this one check that the framers of our

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Constitution laid out, which they never expected

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probably to ever happen, whether that check was in

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play, what we didn't realize at the same time, the

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president who was on trial, the Congress was on

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trial because the Congress had to make a decision

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which was momentous, which affected the country.

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The stakes were very high. If we wanted to have

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justice done, we couldn't be seen to be.

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Acting in a partisan way, so the effort was very

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serious and sincere. The House Judiciary Committee

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went out of its way to act and as much a

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nonpartisan way as possible because we did not

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want any questions to be asked about where we

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being unfair to Richard Nixon. So we wanted to do

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whatever we did correctly.

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Ever since the existence of the White House taping

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system was first made known last summer, I have

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tried vigorously to guard the privacy of the tapes.

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I've been well aware that my efforts to protect

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the confidentiality of presidential conversations

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has heightened the sense of mystery about

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Watergate and in fact, it has increased suspicions

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of the president. Many people assume that the

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tapes must incriminate the president, but

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otherwise he wouldn't insist on their privacy. We

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had no idea that there would be tapes that we

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would listen to and the impact of those tapes,

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which probably no president now is ever going to

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have in the White House again, really was the

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crushing blow. And when I heard the tapes and had

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to make that decision, that's that's really what

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was a major factor in terms of ultimately deciding

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the vote. No one in the White House was involved.

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I want there to be no question remaining about the

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fact that the president has nothing to hide. He

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wasn't able to admit his mistakes if he would have

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been able to have gone before the camera and said,

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look, I'm sorry events happened that were not

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right. It was wrong and I was wrong. And I I asked

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the American public for forgiveness. And I still

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want to be your president. I think our public is a

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forgiving kind of public. And the voter would have

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accepted that. And I think it would have been very

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difficult to proceed. I think that argument would

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have been hard. He could have acknowledged what

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happened and I think it would have been taken on

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its face and perhaps would have changed the

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ultimate outcome.

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The only other emotional moment that came to me

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was that I felt sad when we had the vote

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was very emotional because I didn't want to

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impeach the president, I didn't want to remove a

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president. I didn't want to acknowledge the abuse

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of office. Mr. Flowers, I. Mr. Sarbanes, I, Mr.

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Railsback.

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MS. Holtzman, I. Nobody took any pleasure in that

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vote. I didn't agree with many of the things that

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Richard Nixon stood for, but I hated having to

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cast that vote because he was my president and I

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did not want to see president of the United States

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engage in that conduct. But I knew I had no choice.

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I knew I had a responsibility under the

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Constitution to hold him accountable. Mr. Cohen.

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Mr. Rodino, I.

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Mr. Konya, I.

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Mr. Mezvinsky, I mean, we talked among ourselves,

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including the Barbara Jordan and the other people

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and the chairman Rodino instead, it was a sad

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moment, but yet it was probably one of the finest

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hours for Congress. Later, we discovered when we

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voted for the impeachment of Richard Nixon, I

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don't recall that any poll had been taken. So

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nobody exactly knew what the consequences of this

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were going to be. We just did what the evidence

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and the Constitution and the law told us was the

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right thing to do. And then when Nixon had to make

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he made his resignation speech in the White House

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and he talked about it. And I was then driving to

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the Hill. This was after the hearings and

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everything. I literally pulled off the road and

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cry because I felt what it did to our country. But

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yet, on the other hand, it was, as I indicated,

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Congress on trial. It was the test and it probably,

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as I said, came out to perhaps be one of the

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finest hours.

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The impeachment of the president is a remedy of

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last resort. It is the most solemn act of our

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entire constitutional process. The impact of such

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an ordeal would be felt throughout the world, and

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it does have its effect on the lives of all

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Americans. For many years to come, there were many

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people who said the country cannot withstand an

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impeachment, that this would be tear the country

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apart, that we could never do this. It would be

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terrible. But, you know, the fact of the matter is,

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Americans are pretty strong people and our country

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is a pretty strong country. And no, the country

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did not collapse in the face of the of the

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impeachment effort. In fact, I think it became

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stronger because Americans discovered that in the

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end, we all shared the same value, or most of us

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overwhelming majority, shared the values that more

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important than a president, a party was the

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Constitution and the rule of law, that we were a

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democracy. So the president did something wrong

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and this was the procedure and the procedure was

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going to be followed. Here we are 40 years later

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and no one's really seriously attacked. The

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process in which under which the committee acted

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or the results of the impeachment process, the

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papers should be available for the public and for

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researchers to sort of know what what we went

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through. The history of this also maybe as a

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lesson as to perhaps how government can run,

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whether you're a partisan on one side or the other,

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that there comes a time when you know the country,

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you have to face issues and you have to come

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together as a people to deal with with volatile

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issues. Yes. That are emotional. But yet you

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expect your government and your representatives to

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sort of be to be able to do that, to take those

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positions. So it really showed that the

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institutions of government can work and what the

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founders really intended to do. So I hope the

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papers will bring out perhaps what can be done

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rather than what we're witnessing perhaps on the

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front pages and on television today.

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Who I have to follow that.

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The way we proceed this evening is I'm going to

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introduce all the panelists first, you've met two

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thirds of them already in the in the video, and

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then we're going to have asked them to speak for

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about ten minutes and then open up the process for

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for questions and answers with the audience here.

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I want to first introduce Elizabeth Holtzman from

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New York City. She is the former member of

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Congress from 1973 to 1981. And as you saw, she

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served on the Judiciary Committee during the

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Watergate period, MS.. Holtzman is a native of

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Brooklyn, New York, and she has served as district

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attorney for Kings County, New York, or Brooklyn,

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and as the New York City comptroller. Welcome, and

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we're delighted to have you here in Iowa.

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Our second speaker is Edward Mezvinsky. He's a

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native of Ames, former congressman representing

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the 1st District of Iowa in Congress from 1973 to

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1977. He also, as you saw, served on the House

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Judiciary Committee during the Watergate period

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and was involved in the impeachment process just

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this afternoon. Ed turned over his Watergate

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related papers to the Issue Library, as well as a

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number of his campaign memorabilia and so on. And

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they will be on display in the special collections

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until March of next year. And welcome back home to

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Ames here, Ed, and thank you very much for the

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papers.

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I thought speaker third member of the panel here

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tonight is Jonathan Yaroslavsky. He's currently

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attorney with Wilbur Wilmer Hale, law firm in

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Washington, D.C. But he has had a distinguished

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career in serving in several senior level

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government positions. These include special

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counsel to former President Clinton, general

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counsel of the House Committee on the Judiciary,

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and chief counsel of the House Judiciary

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Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law. With

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these appointments, as you can see and I can just

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add, he was on the Judiciary Committee during the

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Watergate period. Welcome to Ames and Iowa State.

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I might just add a fourth member of our panel,

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Nick Kotz, was not able to be with us this evening.

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His wife suffered a fall and he was unable to

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travel to Iowa. I was asked and I'm not sure if

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the panelists will all do this, but I was asked to

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formulate a couple of questions to kind of get the

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discussion going. And so I'll throw these out and

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hopefully they'll be answered in the course of the

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discussion. I'd like to know what each of these

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panelists most vivid memory of the Watergate

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hearings in the process as it related to the

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politics and the political process. Secondly, I'd

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like to know what are one or two lessons that

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Americans should learn from this Watergate

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experience and is there any evidence that we have

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have learned these lessons since the Watergate

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days? So let me start by asking Elizabeth Holtzman

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to present her thoughts.

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Thank you so much and thank you for the warm, warm

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welcome here in Iowa, and thanks so much to you,

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Ed, for the honor of appearing here today with you

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was a great privilege to serve on the House

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Judiciary Committee and a great honor to know Ed

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and to work with him. And of course, this is a

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wonderful day for the university, too, because

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he's donated his papers, including the papers

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about the impeachment, which I certainly know will

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be of inestimable, that inestimable value to

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students and scholars now and in the future. I'm

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going to focus my comments on the second question,

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the lessons that we've learned or should have

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learned from Watergate. And normally I don't write

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out a speech, but I want to make sure that I got

[00:17:53]
most of my thoughts in here. So you'll bear with

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me, please? I hope. Watergate in a very different

[00:18:03]
context. As has been said, it was the worst of

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times and it was the best of times, the country

[00:18:11]
saw its duly elected president, Richard Milhous

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Nixon, exposed widespread violations of the law

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and abuses of power. Yet the country also saw the

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president resign his office because the other

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institutions of government, the U.S. House of

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Representatives, the Senate and the courts, as

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well as the press and the American people, stood

[00:18:36]
up for the rule of law. I just want to review some

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of the facts, because I know that at least one or

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two people in this room wasn't around really at

[00:18:45]
the time of Watergate. So. I think it's really

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important to kind of get that kind of grounding,

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so you'll forgive me. On June 17th, 1972,

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operatives working for President Nixon's

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re-election campaign broke into the Democratic

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National Committee headquarters at the Watergate

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Hotel in Washington, D.C. That's why it's called

[00:19:05]
Watergate and installed bugging equipment. While

[00:19:10]
the burglars objectives remain unknown to this day,

[00:19:14]
they were clearly intending to subvert the

[00:19:16]
presidential election slated for that November.

[00:19:19]
This is June election in November. Spotting their

[00:19:22]
activities, an alert security guard called the

[00:19:25]
police. The burglars were arrested and and caught

[00:19:28]
with cash traceable to the Nixon re-elect campaign

[00:19:31]
and an address book that listed a White House

[00:19:34]
employee because the arrests could have exposed

[00:19:38]
Nixon's campaign role in a serious crime, burglary

[00:19:43]
and threatened Nixon's reelection. A large scale,

[00:19:47]
presidentially orchestrated cover up swung into

[00:19:51]
high gear. White House lobbying blocked a House

[00:19:55]
committee committee's effort to subpoena

[00:19:57]
information about the cash. The White House

[00:20:00]
enlisted the CIA to stop the FBI's investigation.

[00:20:05]
Promises of presidential pardons and payments of

[00:20:09]
hush money received as illegal contributions by

[00:20:12]
the Nixon campaign bought the burglars silence.

[00:20:16]
The president himself obtained secret grand jury

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information and passed it on to prospective

[00:20:22]
witnesses. The cover up worked. Soon, the

[00:20:27]
headlines generated by the initial arrests of the

[00:20:29]
burglars faded from notice, and President Nixon

[00:20:33]
won his November re-election in one of the largest

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landslides in the history of the United States.

[00:20:40]
Within two months of the election, however, the

[00:20:44]
cover up began to unravel. Slowly but surely, the

[00:20:48]
facts started tumbling out. What the White House

[00:20:50]
would characterize as a third rate burglary turned

[00:20:53]
out to be part and parcel of a pattern of serious

[00:20:57]
crimes and abuses of power ordered or condoned by

[00:21:00]
the president of the United States himself and

[00:21:03]
throughout his presidency. Watergate became the

[00:21:06]
catch all term used to describe this whole series

[00:21:10]
of varied crimes and abuses. The best known,

[00:21:14]
obviously, this of these misdeeds was a cover up

[00:21:17]
itself, which was a federal crime, obstruction of

[00:21:20]
justice, and which was a mosaic of many, many

[00:21:23]
other crimes, some of which I've previously

[00:21:26]
mentioned. But Watergate included other crimes as

[00:21:30]
well. For example, the White House authorized a

[00:21:35]
break in at Daniel Ellsberg psychiatrist's office

[00:21:39]
to get material to smear him with. There was also

[00:21:43]
a plumbers unit to engage in surveillance created

[00:21:46]
and housed in the White House itself. President

[00:21:50]
Nixon also authorized the illegal wiretapping of

[00:21:54]
journalists and White House staffers.

[00:22:00]
And there were serious abuses of power. President

[00:22:03]
Nixon directed so-called enemies list be created

[00:22:07]
of Americans who opposed his Vietnam War policies.

[00:22:11]
These enemies were to be subjected to harassing

[00:22:14]
IRS audits simply because of their political views.

[00:22:18]
Nixon also ordered the secret bombing of Cambodia

[00:22:21]
without congressional approval. Two sets of books

[00:22:24]
were kept about the bombing, and Congress as a

[00:22:27]
whole was never told. The fortieth anniversary of

[00:22:30]
Watergate of the Watergate break in presents a

[00:22:33]
good opportunity to evaluate the legacy it left

[00:22:37]
from the perspective of 40 years, it is clear that

[00:22:41]
the constitution system of checks and balances

[00:22:44]
worked in Watergate. The framers of the

[00:22:46]
Constitution clearly understood that a president

[00:22:49]
could commit crimes and engage in serious

[00:22:52]
misconduct in office. That is why they inserted

[00:22:55]
the impeachment clause in the Constitution, which

[00:22:58]
allows the removal of president for treason,

[00:23:01]
bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors.

[00:23:04]
They knew that a president could represent such a

[00:23:08]
danger to our democracy that the country couldn't

[00:23:12]
wait until the next election to oust him from

[00:23:15]
office. But interestingly enough, it was the

[00:23:20]
courts that first responded effectively to the

[00:23:24]
Watergate situation, federal Judge John Sirica, a

[00:23:28]
conservative Republican, had been assigned the

[00:23:31]
break in case smelling something fishy. He imposed

[00:23:35]
very tough sentences on the burglars, hoping that

[00:23:38]
one would cave in and tell the truth about what

[00:23:41]
happened. One did and admitted there were higher

[00:23:45]
ups involved. Then the Congress snapped smartly

[00:23:49]
into its proper role once the existence of higher

[00:23:53]
ups in the break and had been disclosed after

[00:23:56]
caving in to a lobbying effort to stop an

[00:23:59]
investigation before. First, the Senate ensured

[00:24:04]
that there would be a thorough investigation of

[00:24:06]
the break-In by insisting that the newly named

[00:24:09]
attorney general appoint an independent special

[00:24:12]
prosecutor. After all, a Justice Department under

[00:24:16]
the thumb of the White House couldn't really be

[00:24:19]
expected to do a thorough and honest job of

[00:24:23]
investigating the White House. So the Senate said

[00:24:27]
to the newly named attorney general, if you want

[00:24:30]
to be confirmed, you have to agree to appoint an

[00:24:34]
independent special prosecutor. And that was done.

[00:24:37]
Archibald Cox, a distinguished Harvard law

[00:24:39]
professor, was named as a special prosecutor,

[00:24:43]
removable only for cause. Second, the Senate then

[00:24:49]
held special hearings into Watergate. John Dean,

[00:24:53]
the former White House counsel to Nixon, testified

[00:24:56]
that there was a cover up and that he had warned

[00:24:58]
the president the cover up was a cancer on the

[00:25:00]
presidency. Another White House staffer revealed

[00:25:04]
the existence of president of a presidential

[00:25:06]
taping system in the Oval Office. The tapes would

[00:25:09]
be the best evidence of whether Dean was right and

[00:25:12]
the president himself was involved in the cover up.

[00:25:15]
Naturally, given the importance of the tapes, the

[00:25:19]
special prosecutor subpoenaed them. President

[00:25:22]
Nixon's fate was sealed when he tried to stop the

[00:25:25]
special prosecutor from getting his Oval Office

[00:25:28]
tapes, ordering him fired. But Nixon did not count

[00:25:34]
on resistance to that order. Neither the attorney

[00:25:38]
general nor his deputy would fire Cox resigning

[00:25:42]
their office. Instead, the third in line and the

[00:25:45]
Justice Department fired Cox. And this series of

[00:25:48]
events became known as the Saturday Night Massacre.

[00:25:52]
The American people rose up against the shoddy

[00:25:55]
spectacle of a president who was trying to block

[00:25:58]
an investigation into his own possible crimes and

[00:26:01]
called for action. This prompted the House

[00:26:04]
Judiciary Committee to commence an impeachment

[00:26:07]
inquiry against President Nixon. The the

[00:26:11]
committee's work was finished when it voted three

[00:26:12]
articles of impeachment on a bipartisan basis in

[00:26:16]
July 1974. The first article spelled out acts that

[00:26:20]
amounted to obstruction of justice, the second an

[00:26:23]
abuse of power, and the third dealt with Nixon's

[00:26:25]
obstruction of the work of the Judiciary Committee

[00:26:27]
itself. The Supreme Court of the United States put

[00:26:32]
the finishing touches on the whole matter by

[00:26:35]
unanimously ruling that President Nixon had to

[00:26:39]
turn over his Oval Office tapes to the special

[00:26:42]
prosecutor in the grand jury. Despite the fact

[00:26:45]
that several of these judges had been appointed by

[00:26:49]
President Nixon himself, all the judges determined

[00:26:53]
that the effective enforcement of the laws and the

[00:26:56]
need for criminal accountability trumped

[00:26:59]
presidential prerogatives. Nixon, not daring to

[00:27:03]
defy the Supreme Court of the United States,

[00:27:05]
release the tapes, including the famous smoking

[00:27:08]
gun tape that showed Nixon ordering the cover up

[00:27:12]
himself. Once the tape became public, all the

[00:27:15]
holdout Republicans on the Judiciary Committee

[00:27:18]
joined the other members in supporting impeachment.

[00:27:20]
And it was now certain that the whole House would

[00:27:23]
vote for the impeachment of Richard Nixon and the

[00:27:25]
Senate would vote to convict him by a two thirds

[00:27:27]
vote. Within days, Richard Nixon resigned,

[00:27:30]
becoming the first president in the history of the

[00:27:33]
United States to do so. In my opinion, the rule of

[00:27:36]
law prevailed. The constitutional system worked.

[00:27:41]
According to Blueprint, a president who put

[00:27:43]
himself above the law was reined in both by the

[00:27:47]
Congress, by both houses of Congress on a

[00:27:50]
bipartisan basis and the courts as important. The

[00:27:55]
American people recognize that they share the

[00:27:57]
basic values that no president was more important

[00:28:00]
than the rule of law. In the end, Watergate was

[00:28:05]
about accountability for presidential wrongdoing.

[00:28:08]
Nixon was exposed, the record of his misdeeds was

[00:28:11]
fully made and presented to the American people.

[00:28:14]
His top aides and dozens of others in his

[00:28:16]
administration went to prison for their misdeeds

[00:28:19]
and his and Nixon himself was named an unindicted

[00:28:22]
co-conspirators aspirator by the grand jury and

[00:28:25]
the cover up criminal case. Even the presidential

[00:28:30]
pardon by Gerald Ford that prevented any

[00:28:33]
prosecution of Nixon did not blot out the record

[00:28:37]
of his wrongdoing. Nixon's disgrace and his

[00:28:39]
misconduct are indelible historical facts. But

[00:28:44]
since then, the legacy of accountability, which

[00:28:47]
was the centerpiece of the of the response to

[00:28:53]
Watergate, seems to have been just evaporating. I

[00:28:59]
just want to take I mean, I could give you a

[00:29:01]
number of examples, but I'm just going to take the

[00:29:02]
abuses of power that occurred during the Bush

[00:29:05]
administration. For example, even though President

[00:29:09]
Bush acknowledged authorizing waterboarding, an

[00:29:13]
act that usually. Is viewed as torture, no

[00:29:17]
investigation has been conducted of his possible

[00:29:20]
violation of the federal Anti Torture Act, which

[00:29:23]
is a felony, even though President Bush publicly

[00:29:27]
acknowledged ordering wiretapping of Americans

[00:29:29]
without a court order. In apparent violation of

[00:29:33]
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, a

[00:29:35]
felony, no criminal investigation has taken place.

[00:29:39]
And no investigation has ever taken place into the

[00:29:43]
origins of the invasion of Iraq, even though there

[00:29:47]
are questions as to whether acts connection with

[00:29:50]
that may also violate U.S. law. I'm not saying

[00:29:53]
they do, but they raise the question instead of

[00:29:56]
accountability, our government, our country seems

[00:29:59]
to have embraced the idea of impunity. Presidents,

[00:30:03]
it seems, are just too iconic to be held to the

[00:30:05]
standard of obeying the law, something applicable

[00:30:09]
to the most of the rest of us, but not to the most

[00:30:12]
powerful in the land. It's also worth noting. That

[00:30:16]
many of the reforms adopted in the wake of

[00:30:18]
Watergate have been weakened or allowed to lapse.

[00:30:22]
Campaign finance reform was prompted by the cash

[00:30:27]
contribution to the Nixon campaign that were used

[00:30:30]
to bribe the burglars for their silence. But the

[00:30:34]
reform laws have been gutted by various Supreme

[00:30:37]
Court decisions, including Citizens United and by

[00:30:41]
LAX Federal Elections Commission enforcement.

[00:30:45]
Nixon's illegal wiretapping was one of the key

[00:30:48]
inspirations for the Foreign Intelligence

[00:30:53]
Surveillance Act, which was designed to prevent

[00:30:56]
executive action, unilateral executive action in

[00:31:01]
wiretapping. You needed a court order. Nixon kept

[00:31:05]
claiming that national security reasons justified

[00:31:08]
his illegal surveillance and the break ins, but

[00:31:10]
that was simply not true. The law that was enacted

[00:31:14]
to respond to the illegal surveillance and the

[00:31:17]
illegal wiretapping has been largely defanged and

[00:31:20]
now we see the consequences. We have widespread

[00:31:26]
surveillance and we're just beginning to

[00:31:28]
understand the scope of it. The special prosecutor

[00:31:32]
law that was enacted because Congress understood

[00:31:36]
that presidents would not investigate themselves,

[00:31:39]
no surprise, and that there needed to be a

[00:31:42]
mechanism to ensure such investigations would be

[00:31:44]
conducted. Appears to have. He has been allowed to

[00:31:50]
lapse, the law designed to ensure there would be

[00:31:53]
no impunity for presidents is no longer in

[00:31:56]
existence. There is no mechanism to ensure an

[00:32:01]
independent investigation if they are grounds to

[00:32:04]
believe, reasonable grounds to believe that a

[00:32:06]
president or other highest officials in the land

[00:32:09]
have committed crimes. And the War Powers Act,

[00:32:13]
which was a direct response to the disclosure

[00:32:15]
about President Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia

[00:32:18]
and the need to have congressional input into war

[00:32:21]
making decisions has been largely pushed aside and

[00:32:24]
ignored. So after 40 years, we appear to have

[00:32:28]
forgotten the critical lessons of Watergate and if

[00:32:31]
anything, are less prepared to deal with executive

[00:32:33]
branch excesses than before, it is a sobering,

[00:32:37]
sobering lesson for us. There's another lesson in

[00:32:41]
light of recent events in which a minority of

[00:32:44]
right wing ideologues in the House and Senate were

[00:32:46]
ready to shut the government down and cause it to

[00:32:49]
default on its debts with potentially catastrophic

[00:32:52]
consequences for our economy and that of the

[00:32:54]
entire world. As I have shown in Watergate,

[00:32:59]
members of the House and Senate broke out of their

[00:33:03]
partisan mold and did what they knew was right for

[00:33:07]
the country. It took enormous courage for Southern

[00:33:12]
Democrats and Republicans on the Judiciary

[00:33:16]
Committee to vote for impeachment, after all,

[00:33:19]
Nixon had carried their districts by huge margins

[00:33:23]
just months before. But they were ready to risk

[00:33:28]
losing their seats to protect the rule of law,

[00:33:33]
stop to think about that. The chair of the House

[00:33:37]
committee of the House Judiciary Committee, Peter

[00:33:40]
Rodino, also understood that the country would

[00:33:43]
never support impeachment if were voted on a

[00:33:46]
bipartisan basis. The outcome of an election was

[00:33:49]
not going to be switched by a rabid congressional

[00:33:52]
majority, no matter which party was in charge. He

[00:33:56]
understood that. And so we bent over backwards to

[00:33:59]
make sure that the procedures were fair to

[00:34:01]
President Nixon. And he brought the Republicans

[00:34:04]
into the decision making up into the decision

[00:34:08]
making on the charges that were ultimately voted.

[00:34:11]
How have we so lost the idea that the country

[00:34:15]
comes first? How has it come about that the

[00:34:18]
parties have so demonized each other that they

[00:34:22]
can't work together? Watergate was a political and

[00:34:27]
constitutional crisis. The country weathered it.

[00:34:31]
Because even though the president did wrong, the

[00:34:35]
people in in Congress and the courts who had to

[00:34:38]
respond to him for the most part, did what they

[00:34:42]
believed was right and acted out of conscience and

[00:34:47]
principle. The question that confronts us is, was

[00:34:51]
that a unique moment in our history? Or can we

[00:34:55]
recapture it again? Thank you.

[00:35:10]
Well, it's it's great to be back in Ames, as Jim

[00:35:15]
pointed out, I was raised, born and raised in Ames,

[00:35:20]
developed a value system in Iowa, the value system,

[00:35:26]
little did I know at the time. And as was pointed

[00:35:30]
out when you watch the video. Little did we know

[00:35:34]
that we would be tested in our value system. When

[00:35:39]
we had to look at and assess whether or not a

[00:35:43]
president should be removed from office. It was

[00:35:48]
alien for me being a growing up in the Midwest.

[00:35:51]
Those of you who are students here know that you

[00:35:55]
don't just look lightly upon removing a president.

[00:36:00]
I grew up. Yes, in Ames and I was elected at the

[00:36:06]
same time that Watergate was breaking. It was

[00:36:10]
breaking in the summer of 72. That was when

[00:36:15]
Richard Nixon was running against George McGovern.

[00:36:20]
And it was viewed as pretty much a hopeless race

[00:36:24]
for George McGovern. And I was running for

[00:36:28]
Congress and really the reason that I happened to

[00:36:31]
be sitting here tonight. Was because of students.

[00:36:37]
Of university of a concern about which way the

[00:36:41]
country was going, we were concerned about Vietnam.

[00:36:46]
Vietnam was on the plate. Front and center, like

[00:36:51]
Iraq, like Afghanistan, like the conflicts of the

[00:36:55]
drones that we see today, it was Vietnam, it was

[00:37:00]
boys going to war. Women were not being drafted at

[00:37:05]
the time, but young men were going to war, they

[00:37:09]
were drafted and there was protests. And so. In

[00:37:14]
the midst of my race. There were students at this

[00:37:19]
time, I was running it in Johnson County and Iowa

[00:37:22]
City and the students were involved. And they were

[00:37:27]
concerned about what was happening with the

[00:37:28]
country. There was protest. They were overtly out

[00:37:34]
in front. They weren't passive, they were

[00:37:38]
concerned. And as a result of that, here I am in

[00:37:42]
Ames 40 years later, to a great extent, because of

[00:37:47]
the kind of student body and the kind of

[00:37:49]
organization that I see here.

[00:37:53]
So many of you here concerned about, yes, the

[00:37:57]
lessons of Watergate, but obviously concerned

[00:38:00]
about which way the country was going. And then

[00:38:05]
you may be interested to know how do you get on

[00:38:07]
the Judiciary Committee? In those days, you had to

[00:38:11]
have the blessing of a chairman of the Ways and

[00:38:15]
Means Committee and. Some of us flew down to

[00:38:20]
Little Rock, Arkansas. It wasn't Bill Clinton's

[00:38:24]
Arkansas at that time. It was a person by the name

[00:38:27]
of Wilbur Mills. And I went in to plead my case to

[00:38:31]
get on the Judiciary Committee. I was trained as a

[00:38:34]
lawyer. And I felt I was concerned about which way

[00:38:38]
the country was going. And here in an agricultural

[00:38:42]
state, I was concerned that. Large farms, we're

[00:38:47]
getting larger and the small farmer was having a

[00:38:50]
difficult time and I was concerned about the issue

[00:38:54]
of antitrust of the bull, the big guys at the top

[00:38:59]
controlling what was going on in this country. And

[00:39:03]
so I made the plea to get on the Judiciary

[00:39:05]
Committee and I was told. At that time, well, I

[00:39:08]
don't know if you'll get on, because the president,

[00:39:11]
past president called and there was a candidate

[00:39:14]
from Houston, from from Texas. Her name was

[00:39:17]
Barbara Jordan, a wonderful woman who did get on

[00:39:22]
the Judiciary Committee. And then I was able to

[00:39:25]
get on with Liz Holtzman. And little did we know

[00:39:28]
when Spiro Agnew, the vice president, got in

[00:39:31]
trouble. And was removed under the Constitution,

[00:39:36]
we had to decide what was going to be done with

[00:39:40]
the next vice president. And there was a

[00:39:43]
congressman from Detroit, his name was John

[00:39:46]
Conyers, and there was a father priest. By the

[00:39:51]
name of Robert Drinan from Massachusetts, and we

[00:39:56]
all went into a caucus list, we will remember this

[00:40:00]
and we had to decide President Nixon nominated

[00:40:03]
Gerald Ford. The same. Person that later.

TRANSCRIPTION END